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Health insurance in the United States is typically acquired through an employer-sponsored
program. Often an employee oﬀerred employer-provided health insurance has the option
to extend coverage to their spouse and dependents. We investigate the implications of the
“publicness” of health insurance coverage for the labor market careers of spouses. The theo-
retical innovations in the paper are to extend the standard partial-partial equilibrium labor
market search model to a multiple searcher setting with the inclusion of multi-attribute job
oﬀers, with some of the attributes treated as public goods within the household. The model
is estimated using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
using a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator. We demonstrate how previ-
ous estimates of the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for health insurance based on
cross-sectional linear regression estimators may be seriously biased due to the presence of
dynamic selection eﬀects and misspeciﬁcation of the decision-making unit.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D1, J33, J64
Keywords: Household Search, Health Insurance Provision, Marginal Willingness to Pay1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Health insurance in the United States is typically acquired through an employer-sponsored program.
Even though health insurance can be purchased through private markets, the cost is considered pro-
hibitive in comparison with the eﬀective cost of purchasing health insurance though an employer. There
are many possible reasons for this diﬀerence, such as tax subsidies to ﬁrms who oﬀer such insurance
to their employees, risk-pooling among a large group of relatively healthy individuals (i.e., individuals
employed at a given ﬁrm), or sharing of a cost (health insurance) that improves the quality of the
employment match to both sides of the contract (e.g., Dey and Flinn, 2005).
Another empirical regularity regarding health insurance purchase and coverage is that in households
in which both husbands and wives work health insurance is often only purchased (through their em-
ployer) by one of the spouses. Apparently this reﬂects the fact that health insurance is largely a public
(household) good in that most employers who oﬀer health insurance to their employees also include the
option to cover spouses and dependent children. In this research our goal is to investigate the impli-
cations of the “publicness” of health insurance coverage for the labor market careers of spouses and
the cross-sectional distribution of wages and health coverage statuses of spouses. We use a relatively
innovative household search framework to address this question.
A large empirical literature exists on the relationship between health insurance coverage and wage
and employment outcomes, though most of it is formulated at the individual level; reasonably com-
prehensive surveys can be found in Gruber and Madrian (2001) and Currie and Madrian (1999). The
research objective in these studies is almost invariably the estimation of a distribution of marginal
willingness to pay (MWP) parameters characterizing the population, and the framework is that of com-
pensating diﬀerentials. When a formal modeling framework is developed, it is a variant of a static labor
supply model, with reference made to household rather than individual choice on rare occasions. This
is a questionable choice given the great deal of concern in this literature with assessing the impact of
employer-provided health care coverage on job mobility. Dey (2001) and Dey and Flinn (2005) take
the position that to analyze mobility behavior requires a dynamic model with labor market frictions,
which led them to employ a search framework with both unemployed and on-the-job search. Estimates
from the equilibrium matching-bargaining model in Dey and Flinn (2005) led them to conclude that the
productive ineﬃciencies resulting from the employer-provided health insurance system were not large.
The conclusions drawn from all of these empirical studies may be questioned due to their focus on
individual rather than household behavior.1 A few attempts have been made to look at the impact
of the health insurance coverage of a spouse on the other’s employment probability. For example,
Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000) estimate that having an employed husband with a job covered by
health insurance reduces a wife’s probability of employment by 20 percent. However, their econometric
model does not allow for simultaneity in these decisions, labor market frictions, and does not condition
on the husband’s wage rate. To understand the distribution of health insurance and wages across spouses
and households, it is necessary to formulate a more appropriate framework for the analysis.
To simplify the modeling and estimation problem, and to promote comparability with previous
analyses, we adopt a very simple speciﬁcation of household behavior. We assume the existence of a
(instantaneous) household utility function in which consumption and health insurance coverage are
additively separable. The subutility function associated with consumption is a quasiconcave function
of (instantaneous) household income, and the instantaneous payoﬀ if at least one of the spouses has
employer-provided health insurance is ξ. Learning the parameter ξ, are something analagous to it, seems
to be the goal of most empirical attempts to estimate the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for health
1Outside of this particular application, the importance of looking at unemployment phenomena at the household rather
than individual level was recognized early on by Humphrey (1939).
1insurance coverage.
Two important contributions make clear the perils of attempting to infer tastes from cross-sectional
relationships generated by dynamic choices among jobs oﬀering diﬀerent combinations of utility-yielding
characteristics. Hwang et al. (1998) make the point using the equilibrium search framework of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), and Gronberg and Reed (1994) provide an empirical example by estimating a
MWP parameter within a compensating diﬀerentials model using job duration data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. The point of both of these studies is to illustrate how the cross-
sectional relationship between wages and job characteristics is determined by the primitive parameters
characterizing the search equilibrium. The cross-sectional “trade oﬀ” between wages and health insur-
ance coverage, for example, is an extremely complicated function of ξ and the parameters characterizing
the labor market environments of the spouses. In general, the only way to consistently estimate ξ is to
simultaneously estimate all model parameters, a path that we follow in this paper.
The contributions of this paper with respect to those mentioned in the previous paragraph are
(1) the extension to a multiple agent setting in which job attributes have a public good aspect and
(2) estimation of the behavioral model. We provide a lengthy discussion regarding the challenges of
estimating a multiple agent model in continuous time given the discreteness of the data to which we
have access. We use the method of simulated moments (MSM) in conjunction with data from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate the model parameters. We ﬁnd evidence that
utility is a concave function of instantaneous income and that there is a positive valuation of health
insurance coverage by the household. We show that this estimate is sensitive to the speciﬁcation of
the instantaneous utility function, as is to be expected. Our estimates of the preference parameter ξ
vary widely depending on the moments included in the implementation of the MSM estimator. Under
our preferred speciﬁcation, which includes “cross moments,” (which are functions of the labor market
outcomes of both spouses and not only of one), we ﬁnd a high estimated value of ξ, indicating the
possibility of important welfare gains in the population if the health insurance coverage rate can be
signiﬁcantly increased.
In a section directed to policy makers, we discuss how our estimation results cast doubt on previous
attempts to infer the MWP using linear regression approaches with cross-sectional data. Using our data
and estimates, we demonstrate how the diﬀerence in mean earnings between those with and without
employer-provided health insurance bear a complicated relationship to ξ and the other parameters de-
scribing the labor market environmnet. We also show that, even with a constant valuation of health
insurance coverage in the population, cross-sectional estimates of the MWP will appear to be heteroge-
neous. In our framework, this phenomenon arises through the omission of relevant state variables (the
labor market status of the spouse) that vary in the population in the steady state. These results point
to the necessity of looking at the valuation of the health insurance coverage in the household context.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model of household search using
a household utility function approach. Section 3 contains an analysis of the implications of the model
under various speciﬁcations of the household utility function. Section 4 includes a discussion of the data
source and presents some descriptive statistics. In Section 5 we develop the econometric model and
discuss why cross-sectional, regression-based estimates of the MWP bear little relation to the true value
of that function. Section 6 contains a discussion of the estimates of model parameters, and in Section 7
we indicate the manner in which our modeling approach and results may inform policy-makers in this
ﬁeld. A brief conclusion is provided in Section 8.
22 The Modeling Framework
In this section we develop our modeling framework and point out the innovations. Due to data limi-
tations and for reasons of tractability, we assume that household preferences can be represented by a
utility function with reasonably standard properties. In particular, we assume that the utility ﬂow to
the household is given by
U(I,d;Z,γ,ξ)=g(I;Z,γ)+ξd,
where Z is a vector of household characteristics, assumed to be time invariant, I is instantaneous income
of the household, d is an indicator variable that assumes the value 1 when anyone in the household
purchases health insurance through their employer, g is a diﬀerentiable, concave function of I, γ is an
unknown parameter vector, and ξ is a nonnegative scalar.2 We assume that all household consumption
is public in the sense that
I = w1 + w2 + Y1 + Y2,
where wi is the instantaneous wage rate of spouse i and Yi is the instantaneous receipt of nonlabor
income of spouse i. As in most search-theoretic models, we ignore the capital market and assume that
all income is consumed the same moment it is received.3
The labor market is structured as follows. When not employed spouse i receives oﬀers of employment
at a rate λN
i and while employed they receive oﬀers at rate λE
i . When employed, spouse i is subject
to “involuntary” dismissals at a rate ηi. Job opportunities are characterized by the pair (w,h), where
w is the wage oﬀer and h is an indicator variable that assumes the value 1 when the job oﬀers health
insurance. We do not assume that spouses draw from the same distributions; we denote the job oﬀer
distribution faced by spouse i as Fi(w,h). Spouse i receives independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) draws from Fi, and the wage draws of the two spouses are independently distributed conditional
on observable and/or unobservable spouse-speciﬁc characteristics.
We denote the vector-valued state variable characterizing the household’s decision problem by S,
which includes (w1,h 1,w 2,h 2)0; 4 the steady state value associated with the state vector S is given by
V (S). When spouse i is employed wi > 0 a n dw h e nn o te m p l o y e dwi =0 . W h i l ei ti sp o s s i b l et ow r i t e
down one generic value function summarizing the problem for all possible values of S, d o i n gs oo b s c u r e s
some of the more interesting implications of the model regarding the relationship between the labor
market decisions of the spouses. Thus we prefer to outline the features of each of the three qualitatively
distinct decision problems faced by the household, corresponding to the cases in which zero, one, or two
members are currently employed.
We begin with the more straightforward situation in which neither member is currently working.
Consider a small decision period of length ε, during which at most one event can occur to the household
(which in this case means that at most one of the unemployed spouses can receive a job oﬀer). The
2All of the analysis is unaltered if we allow ξ to vary in the population of households, perhaps with its distribution
depending on Z. Since we treat ξ as constant in the population in the empirical work conducted below, we forego this
minor generalization here.
3This is in contrast to the model developed in Garcia-Perez and Rendon (2004). In their model of household search,
which is set in discrete time, households are allowed to make savings decisions, though they are not allowed to borrow
against future uncertain income.
4For ease of notation we omit the time invariant household characteristics Y and Z from the list of state variables.
3value of the household’s problem in this case is
V (0,0,0,0) = (1 + ρε)−1{g(Y )ε + λN
1 ε
Z




max[V (0,0, ˜ w2,˜ h2),V(0,0,0,0)]dF2(˜ w2,˜ h2)
+(1 − λN
1 ε − λN
2 ε)V (0,0,0,0) + o(ε)}.
where for simplicity we have omitted the arguments Z and γ from the function g and where o(ε) is a
function with the property that limε→0 o(ε)/ε =0 . Because g(I) is a monotone increasing function of
I, w1 and w2 are perfect substitutes in consumption, and d =m a x ( h1,h 2) i nt h ec a s ew ec o n s i d e rh e r e ,
it is straightforward to show that the decision rule has a critical value property. That is, there exists a
function w∗
i(hi) that gives the minimal acceptable wage oﬀer to spouse i given that the job has health
insurance coverage state hi and given that both spouses are currently unemployed. Using this result,
rearranging terms, and taking the limit of the function as ε → 0 we can write















[V (0,0, ˜ w,˜ h) − V (0,0,0,0)]dFw2|h2(˜ w|˜ h)p2(˜ h),
where Fwi|hi is the conditional distribution of wage oﬀers given health insurance status for spouse i
and pi is the marginal distribution of health insurance statuses of job oﬀers to spouse i. Our only
comment concerning this particular value function is that it indicates that the job acceptance decisions
of unemployed spouse i are a function of whether or not health insurance is oﬀered. Moreover, the
reservation wage rates for spouse i depend not only on the characteristics of spouse i’s labor market
environment but also on the labor market environment faced by the other spouse (who is also unemployed
in this case). We also note that because we are assuming that g is concave, the critical values of each
spouse depend on the level of nonlabor income. This would not be the case in the standard search
framework in which g is assumed to be linear.
Next consider the situation in which one spouse is currently employed; let us assume that it is
individual 1, at a job characterized by (w1,h 1). Performing similar operations to what we did above,
we can write the steady state value of this case as














[max[V (w1,h 1, ˜ w,˜ h),V(0,0, ˜ w,˜ h)] − V (w1,h 1,0,0)]dFw2|h2(˜ w|˜ h)p2(˜ h)
+η1V (0,0,0,0).
The functions ˆ wi(˜ h;w1,h 1,w 2,h 2) i =1 ,2, denote the critical value for job acceptance regarding a wage
oﬀer to spouse i associated with a health insurance status ˜ h given a current job status of (w1,h 1) for
spouse 1 and (w2,h 2) for spouse 2. (Thus w∗
i(˜ h) ≡ ˆ wi(˜ h;0,0,0,0).) We note the following important
points concerning this value function and the decision rules associated with it.
41. In this case, when spouse 1 is employed, the receipt of an oﬀer by spouse 2 c a nr e s u l ti nt h r e e
outcomes. Firstly, the oﬀer can be rejected and the status quo maintained. Secondly, the oﬀer
can be accepted and spouse 1 can remain employed at his job, resulting in an outcome with value
V (w1,h 1, ˜ w,˜ h). Thirdly, the oﬀer could be accepted and spouse 1 could “quit” into unemployment,
resulting in a value of V (0,0, ˜ w,˜ h). When a job oﬀer is accepted by spouse 2, which of the last
two possibilities occurs is determined by comparing the values associated with each of them. For
example, a quit into unemployment by spouse 1 will be relatively more likely when he is working
at a low wage job without health insurance. To get any quits into unemployment, it must be the
c a s et h a tt h er a t eo fa r r i v a lo fo ﬀers in that state be less than it is when employed. The estimates
of primitive parameters we obtain conﬁrm that λN
i À λE
i ,i =1 ,2.
2. The critical values for spouse 1 have the following properties. When the health insurance status
of the current job and the potential job are the same, then the critical wage rate is simply the
c u r r e n tw a g e( s i n c et h e r ea r en om o b i l i t yc o s t s ) ,o r ˆ w1(h1;w1,h 1,0,0) = w1 for h1 =0 ,1. When
the current job oﬀers health insurance and the potential job doesn’t, then ˆ w1(0;w1,1,0,0) ≥
w1, where the nonnegative “wedge” between the wages is a form of “dynamic” compensating
diﬀerential. Conversely, we have ˆ w1(1;w1,0,0,0) ≤ w1 due to the value of gaining health insurance
for household welfare.
3. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this case is the form of the unemployed spouse’s decision
rule. Say that the employed spouse’s job oﬀers health insurance so that his employment is char-
acterized by (w1,1). Even though the family has insurance coverage at this moment in time, it is
not the case that the critical wage value for the unemployed spouse is independent of the health
status of a job oﬀered to her. In particular,
ˆ w2(1;w1,1,0,0) 6=ˆ w2(0;w1,1,0,0).
These values are not the same, in general, because having access to a job with health insurance
has an “option value” even when the other spouse’s current job also oﬀers health insurance. This
is due to the fact that the spouse may lose his job, either involuntarily (at rate η1) or may have the
opportunity to move to a high-paying job that does not oﬀer health insurance. The only situation
in which the inequality above will be an equality is when η1 =0and λE
1 =0 ;in this case the
ﬁrst spouse will keep his current job forever and the family will have perpetual health insurance
coverage. When this is not the case, we will have
ˆ w2(0;w1,h 1,0,0) > ˆ w2(1;w1,h 1,0,0),h 1 =0 ,1.
This is an important result since a number of empirical studies attempt to impute the implicit
price of health insurance in terms of foregone wages by looking at average wage rates of spouses
(possibly conditional on other covariates as well) given the health insurance status of their spouse
(see, e.g., Olson (2001)). Even though the value of health insurance is less to a woman who has an
employed husband paid w1 when he has a job covered by health insurance than when he doesn’t,
she is still willing to pay for health insurance with a reduced wage rate. Thus the diﬀerence
in average wages of these two groups of women does not represent a pure valuation of health
insurance to the family. Furthermore, the average wage earned by a woman as a function of the
current health insurance status of her husband depends on when she took her job (e.g., before the
husband had accepted a job with health insurance, at a point when both held jobs in the past, at a
point when her husband was unemployed, etc.). Thus labor market dynamics must be accounted
for in assessing the valuation of health insurance to the household and its impact on labor market
outcomes.
5The last case to consider is when both spouses are currently employed. The steady state value of
this case can be written as














[max[V (0,0, ˜ w,˜ h),V(w1,h 1, ˜ w,˜ h)] − V (w1,h 1,w 2,h 2)]dFw2|h2(˜ w|˜ h)p2(˜ h)
+η1V (0,0,w 2,h 2)+η2V (w1,h 1,0,0).
Given the assumptions we have made regarding the household utility function, it is not diﬃcult to
establish the existence of these critical value functions and the following properties of these functions
and V (w1,h 1,w 2,h 2).
1. If the health insurance status of a job oﬀered to spouse i i st h es a m ea st h a to ft h e i rc u r r e n tj o b
then the critical wage is equal to the current wage, or
ˆ w1(˜ h;w1,˜ h,w2,h 2)=w1, ˜ h =0 ,1.
2. Even when the other spouse is employed at a job with health insurance, the individual is willing
to pay a “premium” for a job that includes health insurance. For example, say that spouse 2 is
working at a job with health insurance and spouse 1 is not. Then
ˆ w1(1,w 1,0,w 2,1) <w 1,
a n di fb o t hs p o u s e sc u r r e n t l yh a v ej o b st hat provide health insurance spouse 1 will have to be
“compensated” for accepting a new job that does not include it,
ˆ w1(0,w 1,1,w 2,1) >w 1.
3. Isomorphic to these properties of the critical value function is the ordering of the value functions:
V (w1,1,w 2,1) > max[V (w1,1,w 2,0),V(w1,0,w 2,1)] >V(w1,0,w 2,0).5
3 Analysis of the Model
Our modeling framework is of interest not only for the analysis of health insurance and labor market
transition issues, but also can be thought of as a critique of single agent models of labor market
mobility. Our claim is that previous single-agent models of labor market decisions will be misleading
representations of the mobility process unless certain conditions hold. One of the goals of the empirical
work reported below is to assess how misleading the single-agent models are likely to be, at least within
this particular application.
Our instantaneous household utility function has the form
U(I,d;Z,γ,ξ)=g(I;Z,γ)+ξd.
We further specialize the market good utility yield function to be
g(I;Z,γ)=g(γ(Z)I),
where γ is a function of observable household characteristics Z. We consider the following special cases.
5The strict inequalities hold as long as the possibility of mobility (voluntary or involuntary) is positive for both spouses.
63.1 No valuation of health insurance and linear g.
This is the standard partial-partial equilibrium model of search; the only novelty in this case is the fact
that there are two agents involved in the problem. But now we have
U(I,d;Z,γ,0) = γ(Z)I
= γ(Z)(w1 + w2 + Y ).
Since nonlabor income is received by the household in any state of the world, and the marginal utility
of income is constant, we have




Given the constant marginal utility of income, no decision of spouse i can depend on the wage of spouse
i0. Given this separability, we can write
˜ V (w1,w 2)=˜ V1(w1)+˜ V2(w2).
The value functions are indexed by spouse number since the search environments for the two are
not constrained to be equal, where the search environments are characterized by (λN
i ,λ E
i ,ηi,F i). An
individual is better oﬀ within a household strictly due to income pooling. As a single agent, the value










The others spouse’s wage is simply another form of nonlabor income (albeit transitory in nature), and
agent i’s welfare is maximized by having the spouse act so as to maximize the expectation of the present
value of their wage stream.
3.2 Valuation of health insurance and linear g
Health insurance is a very particular type of good. In our model, consumption within the household is
considered to be a public good, and health insurance is thought of in this way as well. This makes it
fundamentally diﬀerent from other components of a compensation package, such as the characteristics
of one’s oﬃce, the personalities of one’s colleagues, etc., that yield a payoﬀ which is primarily accrued
to the individual employee. This, plus the fact that health insurance is such an important component
of compensation in dollar value, makes it and pension beneﬁts the most important components of
remuneration following wages and salary.
The instantaneous payoﬀ function in the present case is given by
γ(Z)(w1 + w2 + Y )+ξd.
At ﬁrst glance it might seem that the arguments applied to the previous case applied here as well, i.e.,
that household would maximize welfare by having the spouses act in a totally “decentralized” manner.
This would be true if the payoﬀ function was given by
γ(Z)(w1 + w2 + Y )+ξ(h1 + h2).
7In this case we would have




However, we have assumed that health insurance beneﬁts are perfect substitutes, so that
d =m a x ( h1,h 2).
In this case the decisions cannot be uncoupled in the sense that spouse i0s decision of whether to accept
aj o bo ﬀer of (wi,h i) will depend on the health insurance status of the spouse, hi0, as well as their own
current wage and health insurance status. As was true in the ﬁrst case considered (linear g, ξ =0 ) ,
labor market decisions will be independent of nonlabor income (Y ) given the constant marginal utility
of income.
3.3 No Valuation of Health Insurance and Concave g
We now consider the form of the decision rules when the household does not value health insurance
and when the marginal utility of income is decreasing. Since the payoﬀ function is not separable in the
arguments (w1,w 2,Y), the value function can not be expressed as a sum of individual value functions
either.
For spouse i currently employed at a job paying a wage of wi, any oﬀer greater than w∗
i(wi,w i0,Y)




wi if wi > 0
w∗
i(0,w i0,Y) if wi =0 .
In other words, for a currently unemployed individual, the value of their spouse’s current wage (wi0)
and nonlabor income Y are both arguments of the critical value function. The impact of Y and wi0 on
w∗
i is impossible to unambiguously sign, which may seem somewhat surprising at ﬁr s t( a tl e a s ti tw a s
to the authors).
The reason for the ambiguity is that the both costs and beneﬁts of search are altered by what is
essentially nonlabor income in the job acceptance decision of spouse i. First consider household nonlabor
income, Y. Given strict concavity in g, increases in Y decrease the marginal utility of any given wage
oﬀer to spouse i, wi. Since the wage oﬀer distribution to the spouse is ﬁxed, this makes the expected gain
from search decrease in Y. If the costs of search were ﬁxed, we would expect the reservation wage to be
a decreasing function of Y. However, the costs of search are not ﬁxed. Instead, the ﬂow value of search
is given by g(wi0 + Y ), which is increasing in Y. Thus the cost of continued search is decreasing in Y.
The net impact of the reduced expected value of search (in Y ) and the reduced cost (in Y ) leads to the
ambiguity. The actual impact on w∗
i i ng e n e r a lw i l ld e p e n do nwi0,g ,and all parameters characterizing
the labor market environments of both spouses.
Analysis with respect to changes in wi0 is similar, apart from the fact that, in general, wi0 is transitory
and Y is permanent. A high value of wi0 decreases the expected value of search by spouse i, while at
the same time decreasing the cost of search. Now if the labor market environment of spouse i0 was such
that they would keep this wage forever, Y and wi0 would have identical impacts on the w∗
i. However,
the transitory nature of the spouse’s wage requires that they be treated as separate arguments in the
reservation wage function of i.6
6Consider the extreme example where the exogenous dissolution rate of spouse i
0 jobs grows indeﬁnitely large. The
instantaneous cost of search is then decreasing in their wage wi0, though the impact of their wage on the expected value of
continued search is 0 due to the fact that the probability that the job will end in the next small interval of time approaches
unity. In this extreme case, the reservation wage will be an increasing function of wi0.
83.4 Valuation of Health Insurance and Concave g
This is the most general case we consider, and is the focus of our empirical analysis. By extension of
the previous arguments, particularly those related to the cases of linear g with positive ξ and concave
g with ξ =0 , the critical value for job change is given by
ˆ wi(˜ h;w1,h 1,w 2,h 2,Y),
as deﬁned previously (where we had omitted the argument Y since it is time invariant). In general, all
arguments appear individually in the function and are necessary to characterize the turnover decision
(where by turnover we also implicitly include the change from the unemployment to the employment
state). In other words, the vector (w1,h 1,w 2,h 2,Y) is a minimal suﬃcient statistic for the job accep-
tance decisions of household members.
3.5 Discussion
The diﬀerences in the properties of the objective functions in the four cases we have considered produce
critical value functions that diﬀer in terms of their arguments, as well as qualitative diﬀerences in
household labor market histories. We present a summary of some of these diﬀerences in the following
table.
Objective Function Arguments of w∗
i Simultaneous Change Lower Wage
α + βI wi No No
α + βI + ξd wi,˜ h,h1,h 2 Yes Yes
g(I;Z,γ),gconcave wi,w i0,Y Yes No
g(I;Z,γ)+ξd, g concave wi,w i0,˜ h,h1,h 2,Y Yes Yes
The last two columns are interpreted as follows. Whether the model implies that the labor market
states of the spouses could change at the same moment in time is indicated under “Simultaneous
Change.” In the ﬁrst case, each spouse solves their own individual search problem with no reference
to the other agent’s state. Since time is continuous, the likelihood that they would be subject to
independent shocks resulting in labor market state changes at the same moment in time is zero. Thus
the “no” entry. All other models carry the likelihood of simultaneous state change. For example, the
third model can generate simultaneous state change if the unemployed spouse of a worker being paid
wi receives a wage oﬀer wi0, when wi is suﬃciently low and wi0 is suﬃciently high. In this case, the
unemployed spouse may accept the job oﬀerring wi0 and the employed spouse may quit the job paying
wi.
The last column, labelled “Lower Wage,” refers to whether the same spouse could be observed
directly transiting from a job paying a higher wage to one paying a lower wage. This is possible in our
model only when there is a positive valuation of health insurance. In this case, a lower wage may be
accepted when moving from a job not providing health insurance to one oﬀerring it.
By varying the assumptions regarding the objective function of the household, we will be able to
trace out their impact on observed labor market behavior. We will be particularly interested in seeing
how the standard assumption made in the literature of linear g and ξ =0compares against the others,
all of which involve some jointness in the labor market decisions of the spouses.
The jointness of household decision-making is best illustrated through examining the reservation
value functions, which we now do graphically. In this set of examples and the empirical work that












g(I;Z,γ,δ)=l n γ(Z)+l n ( I).
This functional form allows us to nest the standard expected wealth maximization model as a special
case.
In Figures 1.a-1.d we plot the reservation wage function for the wife when she is unemployed as
a function of her employed husband’s wage, an indicator variable for whether his job provides health
insurance, and an indicator variable for whether her oﬀered job provides health insurance. The four
ﬁgures correspond to the four cases considered above. In plotting these functions we have used model
estimates wherever possible.7
Figure 1.a contains the graph of the wife’s (conditional) reservation wage function for the simplest
case examined, the one with a constant instantaneous marginal utility from wages and no valuation of
health insurance. The independence of the wife’s decision rule from the husband’s wage is reﬂected in
the constant reservation wage function. This is the reservation wage she would set in a single agent
model facing the labor market environment she faces. There is no dependence of this function on the
health insurance status of her oﬀer or her husband’s job since the household does not value this job
attribute in this case.
In Figure 1.b things get more interesting. The household is still assumed not to value employer-
provided health insurance, but the (instantaneous) marginal utility of wages is decreasing in household
income. As a result, there is one conditional reservation wage function for the unemployed wife, but it is
no longer constant. Beginning at the reservation wage for an unemployed husband with an unemployed
wife (since this is the lowest wage he would ever accept), we see a rapid increase in the function until
when the husband’s wage is approximately 10. After reaching that point, the function is still increasing,
but at a slower, approximately constant, rate.
The reason for the diﬀerences in the properties of the function over these two intervals is the
husband’s response to the wife’s accepting employment at the reservation value. At low wages, the
husband quits his job and begins a spell of unemployed search. At higher wages, when the wife accepts
the reservation value the husband continues employment in his relatively high paying job. Consider the
case in which the husband is employed at the lowest acceptable wage, which is approximately 5.20. The
wife’s reservation wage at this point is approximately 3.80. If she receives a wage oﬀer slightly greater
than this value, the household will continue with one employed member, after substituting the wife
for the husband. The utility level in the household changes markedly in this case, from (5.20).53/.53
to (3.80).53/.53, but the household is willing to make the tradeoﬀ because the search environment of
the husband dominates that of the wife on virtually every dimension. In the extreme case in which
they both faced identical search environments, on this part of the function the reservation wage of the
wife would be identical to the current wage of the husband, since neither would have any comparative
advantage in search. In such an instance, the household will choose to have the spouse with the highest
7To date we have only estimated the most general version of the model, the one with an unrestricted δ and a positive
ξ. Thus for the general case (Figure 1.d), the graph corresponds to the decision rules generated by the model estimates.
For the other cases, they do not. For example, in Figure 1.b we present the decision rules for the case of linear g but a
positive valuation of health insurance. Since we do not estimate this restricted version of the model, only the qualitative
features of these graphs can legitimately be compared.
10wage oﬀer accept employment. The divergence of the reservation wage path from the 45 degree line on
this segment of the function is an indicator of the asymmetry of the labor market environments of the
spouses.
The ﬁnal two ﬁgures examine the cases in which the household values employer-provided health
insurance. As a result, there are four separate reservation wage functions in each ﬁgure, one for each
combination of h1 (the health insurance status of the husband’s job) and ˜ h (the health insurance status
of the job oﬀered to the wife). Figure 1.c plots these four functions for the case of a constant marginal
utility of consumption. The only reason for the dependence of her decision rules on his job is through
the public good aspect of employer-provided health insurance.
First consider the cases in which the husband’s current job does not provide health insurance, (0,0)
and (0,1). The value of a job oﬀer to the wife that provides health insurance is quite high in this
case, which is reﬂected in the diﬀerence in the reservation wage functions. The other two conditional
reservation wage functions correspond to the case in which the husband’s job provides health insurance.
Comparing these two functions reveals an interesting diﬀerence. Though having a job with health
insurance provides no gain in household welfare at the moment it is accepted (since the household is
already covered by the husband’s policy), the wife is willing to accept a lower wage for such a job
than for one that doesn’t oﬀer her health insurance. The reason is the “option value” associated with
having both spouses covered by health insurance; if the husband should lose his job or quit into one
without health insurance (the likelihood of which depends on whether the wife’s job is covered by health
insurance), the household will still have coverage. This option value only exists with forward-looking
household members.
Figure 1.d plots the four conditional reservation wage functions for the most general case. The
qualitative properties of these functions have been discussed in presenting the other cases, so we won’t
belabor these issues any further. These reservation wage functions, based on estimated model para-
meters, are used to form estimated Marginal Willingness to Pay functions, which are developed and
extensively discussed in Sections 5 through 7.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) are used to
estimate the model. The SIPP interviews households every four months for up to twelve times, so that
at a maximum a household will have been interviewed relatively frequently over a four year period.
The SIPP collects detailed monthly information regarding individual household members’ demographic
characteristics and labor force activity, including earnings, number of weeks worked, average hours
worked, as well as a complete history of mobility decisions (i.e., transitions from unemployment to
employment, transitions from employment to unemployment, and job-to-job changes) over the interview
period. In addition, at each interview date the SIPP gathers data on a variety of health insurance
variables including whether an individual’s private health insurance is employer-provided and covers
other household or non-household members.
The main advantage of using SIPP data is the richness of the data across individuals in the household
and the relative ease of creating these links. This allows a detailed investigation of the relationship
between spouse’s labor market decisions that no other dataset allows. The main disadvantage of using
the SIPP when investigating the eﬀects of health insurance at the household level involves the inability
to distinguish between the lack of coverage and the decision not to takeup coverage. For example, if the
husband receives health insurance coverage through his employer that also covers his wife, we will not
necessarily observe whether she has the option of purchasing health insurance through her employer.8
8While this is the case for the majority of waves (four month data collection intervals) in the SIPP, there are periodic
11The sample used in the empirical work that follows is selected from original sample households that
contain only one family and a married couple. Since we are using transition information in our empirical
work, we select only those households (or families) that remain intact from the original interview to the
eighth interview. We then select households in which both spouses meet certain standard requirements
at each point over the interview period. In particular, both spouses are aged between 20 and 54,
not enrolled in school, not in the Armed Forces, not self-employed, not retired, not disabled, not a
contingent worker, and not receiving welfare beneﬁts. In addition, we selected households that did not
have children less than six years old since a large fraction of women with young children are not actively
seeking employment. The application of these selection conditions limits our sample to 1,267 married
couples.
The dataset we constructed consists of two observations of the household members separated by one
year. The ﬁrst set of outcomes can be viewed as cross-sectional data on the labor market characteristics
of the two spouses in our sample households. For both spouses, we determine the employment status
(i.e, employed or not employed), and if employed, the hourly wage and whether they were covered by
their own employer-provided health insurance coverage in the ﬁnal month of the second fourth month
interview period or wave. We then construct the same set of labor market outcomes for all the spouses
in our sample one year later. That is, we determine the employment status, hourly wage, and provision
of health insurance coverage in the ﬁnal month of the ﬁfth wave. In addition, we determine whether
the sample members switched employers over this one-year period. From these two observations, that
are separated by one year, we can compute transition probabilities and patterns of wage changes.
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics from the sample of households used in our empirical
analysis. As discussed above, these statistics represent the cross-sectional moments pertaining to April
1997 through June 1997 depending on when the household was ﬁrst interviewed. While we use the
transition and wage change information in the empirical work that follows, the cross-sectional moments
are certainly of ﬁrst-order importance and due to the relatively high precision of these moments provide
the majority of the information employed in our estimation strategy. As we discuss in detail below, while
the behavioral model sets out the relationship between the employment decisions of both husbands and
wives, the parameters of the model can be estimated using data from the spouses separately. Therefore,
Table 1 shows key labor market outcomes of husbands and wives in our sample both conditionally and
unconditionally on the labor market status of their respective spouses. We should note that the health
insurance coverage rate is the percent of employed husbands or wives who are covered by insurance
provided by their own employers.
To begin, consider the unconditional labor market outcomes of each spouse. There are three features
of the data that deserve further attention. First, a very small fraction of husbands are unemployed while
nearly 20 percent of wives are unemployed.9 Second, husbands are much more likely than wives to be
covered by health insurance when employed, 80 percent to slightly over 50 percent. Third, for both
husbands and wives, the wages in insured jobs are signiﬁcantly higher than the wages associated with
uninsured jobs. This apparent rejection of “compensating diﬀerentials” was addressed by Dey and Flinn
(2005) using an equilibrium bargaining framework. The “partial-partial” equilibrium model considered
here will also be able to generate such a result, even when the exogenously determined wage oﬀer
(twice over the four year duration of the survey) topical modules that would, in principle, allow us to more fully characterize
the status of employer-provided health insurance for both spouses. In the core data, when an employed wife reports that
she has health insurance through her husband’s employer, we simply do not know whether health insurance is not available
through her employer or she chooses not to purchase coverage that is available. Using the data from the topical module,
we would be able to determine the wive’s insurance status and takeup decision.
9We use unemployment synonymously with nonemployment. Undoubtedly, some of these women are not actively
seeking employment, but since we do not have good information regarding search intensity, we aggregate them all into the
same labor market state.
12distributions conditional on health insurance status have a compensating diﬀerential like property.10
Next, consider the conditional labor market outcomes of each spouse. These moments highlight the
joint nature of the decision-making process and how the outcomes of the two spouses are intimately
linked. First, a wife whose husband is covered by employer-provided health insurance coverage is
almost three times more likely to be unemployed than a wife whose husband is employed without
health insurance. The same relationship holds for husbands although the level of unemployment is
obviously much lower in this case. Second, a wife whose husband is not covered by employer-provided
health insurance is more than twice as likely to have health insurance coverage on her job than an
employed wife whose husband is employed with insurance coverage. Again, the same relationship holds
for husbands although they are only about 50 percent more likely to have employer-provided health
insurance coverage when their wives are not covered. This result also suggests that in a relatively large
number (about 32%) of households both spouses have employer-provided health insurance coverage.
Third, the mean wages of wives employed in insured jobs whose husbands also have employer-provided
coverage are signiﬁcantly lower than the mean wages of wives employed in insured jobs whose husbands
do not have employer-provided coverage. This result is somewhat at odds with the previous discussion
of reservation wages and the results presented in Figure 1.d. above. In this case, the reservation wage
of an unemployed wife who receives an oﬀer that includes health insurance is higher when her husband
has employer-provided health insurance (the (1,1) line in the ﬁgure) compared to when he does not (the
(0,1) line in the ﬁgure). Based solely on reservation wages, this would suggest the opposite relationship
between the conditional mean wages. This suggests that the cross-sectional distribution of employment
states of the household members is a complicated function of the labor market environments facing both
household members and it is impossible to recover reservation wages (and hence marginal willingness
to pay) from cross-sectional data. Finally, the mean wages of wives employed in uninsured jobs whose
husbands have employer-provided health insurance coverage are signiﬁcantly higher than the mean
wages of wives employed in uninsured jobs whose husbands do not have employer-provided insurance
coverage. This result is again diﬃcult to interpret given the dynamic and joint nature of the employment
decisions made by the household members.
5 Econometric Issues
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where all the parameters have been previously deﬁned. In this section we discuss issues connected with
the estimation of this household model.
In previous research (Dey and Flinn, 2005), we estimated a single-agent equilibrium version of this
model using a simulated maximum likelihood estimator. It is diﬃcult to follow the same strategy in
the two-agent case when using a continuous-time framework. As noted when describing the behavioral
model, certain shocks will lead to simultaneous changes in the labor market status of both members
of the household. For example, a wife at a low wage job (with or without health insurance) whose
unemployed husband receives a suﬃciently high wage oﬀer (with health insurance, say), will quit her
job at the same instant the husband accepts the oﬀer. While the continuous time framework is a ﬁction,
of course, there is no nonarbitrary way to “ﬁx” this problem.11
10An example of this would be when the wage oﬀer distribution for jobs not oﬀering health insurance (ﬁrst order)
stochastically dominates the wage oﬀer distribution of jobs that include health insurance. Even in such a case, dynamic
selection on attributes can produce the “good job - bad job” phenomenon in the cross-section.
11For example, one might assume that any time spouses changed states with a period of length ∆, that the moves were
13There are several alternatives one can pursue in this situation. One obvious choice is to abandon
the continuous time framework altogether in favor of a discrete time setting. This approach is not
without its pitfalls, however, there being at least two serious problems. The ﬁrst is the arbitrariness of
the choice of decision unit. Given the characteristics of the SIPP data, the most obvious choice would
be a monthly unit of analysis. Changes in labor market state of both spouses could then be considered
simultaneous, apparently making the ﬁltered data more coherent with the theoretical model. But once
a time period is chosen, we have no model of multiple changes of state within a decision period. While
two or more changes in labor market status of an individual within a given month may be rare, an even
more serious time aggregation problem exists. That problem is the arbitrariness of the boundaries of
the decision period. Say that we choose the ﬁrst day of a calendar month as the beginning of a decision
period and the last day of that month as the end of that period. Then if the wife accepts a new job
on February 21 and the husband quits his job on February 28, those two changes in state would be
considered simultaneous. However, if she accepted her new job on February 28 and he quits on March
1, those would be considered two independent events under this deﬁnition of decision periods. The
general point is that any time aggregation scheme adopted is arbitrary, with impacts on estimates and
inferences that are diﬃcult to assess.
The other argument against “time aggregation” of the type required to map a continuous time
process into a discrete time one is the impact on equilibrium outcomes. In a continuous time point
process type model at most one event occurs at any given moment in time, and both agents respond
to this same event. This allows us to avoid the multiple equilibria-type problems we encounter in the
context of simultaneous move games. In a discrete time model, both agents may receive oﬀers in a
period (an event that has positive probability, in general). In our household utility case, in which we
can think of there being one decision maker, there is no problem in deﬁning a single optimal choice,
in general. However, as we extend the model to look at household behavior when the spouses have
distinct preference maps, we can easily produce examples of multiple equilibria in the simultaneous
move context.12
We have chosen to estimate the model oﬀ of moments of the stationary distribution of labor market
outcomes and the steady state transition function. By not using the “ﬁne detail” of the individual event
histories, we do not have to directly confront the lack of simultaneity issue that is apparent only in the
individual level event history data.
The algorithm used in obtaining the estimates is as follows. Consider some particular sample path
of one simulated history. A simulated history is a mapping from some ﬁxed (over iterations) draws
using a pseudo-random number generator and a value of the parameter vector θk into an event history
for a household. We denote the rth vector of pseudo-random draws by ψr, where the dimension of ψr is
τ × 1 and τ is large. Then the event history associated with the rth replication when using parameter
vector θ is
=r(θ)=J(ψr,θ).
We then deﬁne outcomes as functions of the event history, and these outcomes ultimately are used to
compute the simulated moments upon which the estimator is based. In particular, a data mapping is a
function that maps characteristics of event history = into point-sampled or transitional “data” x, and is
given by x = B(=). By plugging a number of independently generated event histories into B we create
an artiﬁcial data set {x}. From this set of “observations” the simulated moments are calculated.
To give a concrete example, one of the moments used throughout is the proportion of married
simultaneous. In this case, estimated parameters will critically depend on the choice of ∆. Moreover, for large enough ∆
we will observe changes of state of the same individual, which by deﬁnition cannot be made coincidentally.
12For example, say two unemployed spouses receive oﬀers of x and y, respectively. It is easy to ﬁnd cases where two
Nash equilibria exist in which the ﬁrst accepts x and the second declines y or the ﬁrst declines x and the second accepts y.
14women who are employed in the steady state. To compute this moment we will need to measure
whether a wife is employed at an arbitrarily selected point in the event history that is suﬃciently far
away from the initialization of the process. Without loss of generality, all simulated household histories
begin at time 0 with both spouses unemployed. After ﬁxing a value of the primitive parameters, θk,
say, we generate events, such as oﬀer arrivals or dismissals, and their impact on the state variable
describing household labor market characteristics is determined by passing the events through the
expected welfare maximizing decision rules. At a point T À 0, we look at the household’s state,
(w1(T),h 1(T),w 2(T),h 2(T)). If the ﬁrst element of x is the wife’s labor market status at time T, then
x1 =
½
1 ⇔ w2(T) > 0
0 ⇔ w2(T)=0
.
If we compute a total of R simulation histories evaluated at the parameter θk, then






where x1(r) is the value of x1 in replication r.
In order to estimate the model we must attempt to match at least as many characteristics of the
stationary distribution and transition function as there are primitive parameters. Let the dimension of
θ be K. The moments and transition parameters generated from {x} are a mapping given by Γ, or
Q(θk)=Γ({x(r;θk)})
= Γ({B(=r(θk))}).
Let the corresponding sample moments and transition parameters be given by qS. Then we deﬁne the
method of simulated moments estimator by
ˆ θMSM =a r gm i n
θ
(Q(θ) − qs)0W(Q(θ) − qs),
where dim(Q(θ)) = dim(qs)=L ≥ K, and W is a symmetric, positive deﬁnite weighting matrix that is




ˆ θMSM = θ.
Consistency requires that both the sample size and the number of simulation histories become indeﬁ-
nitely large due to the nonlinearity of the model. We believe that our sample size is large enough to
satisfy the ﬁrst requirement, and that the large number of simulated histories (R =1 0 ,000) satisﬁes
the second.
In computing standard errors we do not rely upon asymptotic approximations. Instead we compute
bootstrap estimates of the standard errors by resampling the original dataset 25 times, reestimating the
model, and then computing the standard deviation of the parameter estimates across the 25 samples.
We maintain the same set of simulation draws across all resamples to speed convergence. Because we
have not allowed variation in the simulation draws, thec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo fo u re s t i m a t e si sm o s tl i k e l y
13The weighting matrix is derived directly from the data as follows. We estimate the variances of the sample moments
used in MSM procedure by standard bootstrap techniques with 10,000 resamples of the data. We then deﬁne W as a
diagonal matrix with diagonal elements that are the inverses of the bootstrap variances. This particular choice of the
weighting matrix addresses two concerns. The ﬁrst is to make the scale of the moments roughly the same. The second is
to give more weight to sample moments that are more precisely estimated.
15downward-biased, but since we have used such a large number of simulations we don’t believe that this
bias is substantial.
To be more precise about the nature of the moments we use in the empirical work, we begin with
a discussion of the information used to estimate the single-agent speciﬁcations. In these speciﬁcations
(one for husbands and one for wives), the moments fall into one of eight categories. Since we do not
present the full list of moments in the results section below, we will do so here. The number in paren-
theses is the number of moments in the preceeding category. The categories include the steady-state
employment probabilities (2), conditional (on health insurance status) mean and standard deviation of
wages (4), transition probabilities out of unemployment (2), transition probabilities out of insured jobs
(3), transition probabilities out of uninsured jobs (3), conditional (on health insurance status) mean
and standard deviation of wages following a transition out of unemployment (4), conditional mean and
standard deviation of initial and subsequent wages following a transition out of an insured job (10),
and conditional mean and standard deviation of initial and subsequent wages following a transition out
of an uninsured job (10). Therefore, in the single-agent speciﬁcations we are estimating 11 parameters
with 38 moments. In the ﬁrst joint speciﬁcation, we do not use any cross or household moments so we
are estimating 20 parameters with 76 moments. Finally, in the joint speciﬁcation with cross moments
we include eight additional moments, include four steady-state joint employment probabilities and the
conditional (on health insurance status of employed spouses) covariance of wages. Hence, in the ﬁnal
speciﬁcation we are estimating 20 parameters with 84 moments.
It is notoriously diﬃcult to determine analytically whether a rather complicated nonlinear model
such as this one is identiﬁed. From Flinn and Heckman (1982) we know that the c.d.f.s Fwi|hi,i=1 ,2, are
not identiﬁed nonparametrically. We assume that they both are (conditional) lognormal distributions,
which means that we must estimate 8 parameters (2 lognormal parameters for 2 spouses for 2 health
insurance states). The marginal health insurance oﬀer functions p1 and p2 are each characterized by 3
parameters. While estimation of ρ is in principle possible given some set of assumptions on g, we will
not attempt to do so and will instead ﬁx it using the prevailing interest rate. At present we assume that
the population is homogeneous in the sense that all face the same set of primitive parameters describing
the search environment. The households only diﬀer in terms of the observed state variable Y ,h o u s e h o l d
nonlabor income.14
5.1 Estimation of the MWP for Health Insurance
Almost the entire empirical literature on the relationship between health insurance status and wages is
based on cross-sectional analysis. Most papers use a linear regression approach in which a function of
an individual’s wage is regressed on whether or not the job provides health insurance coverage and a
vector of conditioning variables designed to capture the value of the individual to his or her employer.
A few analyses have proposed instrumental variable estimators to potentially deal with the lack of
independence between the disturbance in such a regression and the health insurance status of the job.
None of these approaches are likely to lead to credible estimates of the MWP, most obviously due
to the fact that the regression framework is an inappropriate one to use with an inherently dynamic
phenomenon.
Gronberg and Reed (1994) and Hwang et al. (1998) provide instructive examples and analysis of
the problem of inferring the MWP using cross-sectional regression methods when the individuals make
job acceptance decisions in a job search environment. We will discuss the problem in the context of our
14While this is true in principle, in practice we choose to ﬁx the nonlabor income of the household at 0 for two reasons.
First, if we allowed Y to vary across households, we would need to solve the model for each value of Y that we observed.
This would signiﬁcantly increase the computational time required to estimate the model. Second, the measures of nonlabor
income are often of poor quality due to a very high non-response rate.
16speciﬁc application (in which the nonpecuniary characteristic is binary) and where the oﬀer distribution
is taken as ﬁx e d . W ew i l lb e g i nw i t ht h es i m p l e rc a s eo f individual search. Let an individual have a
linear payoﬀ function,
u(w,h)=w + ξh, (1)
and assume -=-0-that all labor market participants share a common value of ξ. In this setup, ξ measures
the willingness to pay for health insurance, for an individual will be indiﬀerent between any two jobs,
with and without health insurance, such that
w + ξ = w0,
where the ﬁrst job (with wage w) is the one that includes health insurance. In our partial equilibrium
search model, the searcher faces an exogenously-given (w,h) oﬀer distribution, F(w,h). But given (1),
the payoﬀ from a job (w,h) is given by the scalar random variable
ν = w + ξh.
Thus from the point of view of labor market decisions and the resulting labor market process, only the
distribution of ν is relevant. The distribution of ν is given by M, and is a function of F and ξ. In
particular, there exists a reservation value of ν, ν∗ say, such that any job oﬀer with an associated value
of ν at least as great as ν∗ will be accepted (by unemployed searchers) while any ν<ν ∗ will be rejected.
Then in this simple case (with binary h), we have
ν∗ = w∗(1) + ξ = w∗(0),
where w∗(1) is the reservation wage associated with a jobs oﬀering health insurance and w∗(0) the
reservation wage for a job without health insurance. In a model with homogeneous agents then and
no measurement error in wages and health insurance status, the following consistent estimator of ξ is











where S1 is the set of wage oﬀers associated with jobs oﬀering health insurance that were accepted by
unemployed individuals in the sample, N1 is the cardinality of that set, and S0 and N0 are similarly





ˆ ξ = w(0) − w(1)
is a consistent estimator of ξ.
Cross-sectional regression-type estimators, which amount to diﬀerences in means in our application
with a single binary nonwage characteristic, are not generally expressible simply in terms of reservation
wages. Instead, we will think of the cross-sectional relationship between mean wages in the two sub-
populations of jobs deﬁned by health insurance provision as generated by the steady state equilibrium
distribution of jobs. It is well known that with OTJ search in a stationary environment, the steady










The relationship between the steady state density of ν and the oﬀer distribution of ν is given by
r(ν)=
1+κ
[1 + κ ˜ M(ν)]2m(ν).
It is reasonably immediate to go from the density of r(ν) to the steady state wage distributions
associated with the two health insurance states. Since all the matters in terms of welfare is ν, there
is no diﬀerence between the proportion of jobs providing health insurance given ν in the steady state
and the proportion providing health insurance at ν from the oﬀer distribution. Thus the probability of
health insurance given a value of ν is determined as follows. If a ﬁrm oﬀers health insurance given ν,
t h e nt h ew a g eo ﬀer is ν − ξ. If the ﬁrm does not oﬀer health insurance given ν t h ew a g eo ﬀer is ν. The
likelihood of health insurance and a wage oﬀer of ν − ξ is given by f(ν − ξ,1), while the likelihood of




f(ν − ξ,1) + f(ν,0)
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The mean of the steady state distribution of wage oﬀers given h is
ESS(w|h)=
Z
(ν − h · ξ)r(v|h)dν. (2)
U s i n g( 2 )w ec a nl o o ka tt h ei s s u eo fb i a si ne stimates of the willingness to pay using diﬀerences in
t h em e a nw a g e s .T h ed i ﬀerence in means in the steady state (taken to represent the cross-section) is
ESS(w|h =0 )− ESS(w|h =1 )
=
Z
νr(ν|h =0 ) dν −
Z
νr(ν|h =1 ) dν + ξ.
Then the diﬀerence in cross-sectional mean wages is a consistent estimator of the willingness to pay if
a n do n l yi f Z
νr(ν|h =0 ) dν =
Z
νr(ν|h =1 ) dν.
There is nothing in the construction of the model that suggests this condition should be satisﬁed, though
it is possible to construct examples in which it is. Given estimates of the primitive parameters of the
model, we can compute this expression and determine how badly biased the cross-sectional estimator
of the MWP would be. We conclude this section with an example to ﬁxi d e a s .
18Example 1 Let ξ =1 . To keep things simple, suppose the wage-health insurance oﬀer distribution
is discrete and assumes four values (with equal probability) and let κ =2 . The characteristics of the
distributions of interest appear below.
(w,h) νM (ν) R(ν) p(h|ν) R(ν|h =1 ) R(ν|h =0 )
(2,1) 3 .25 .10 1 .286 0
(4,0) 4 .50 .25 0 .286 .231
(4,1) 5 .75 .50 1 1.00 .231
(6,0) 6 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 1.00
Among the population in the health insurance state, there are only two observable wages, 2 and 4, with
pSS(w =2 |h =1 )=.286 and pSS(w =4 |h =1 )=.714, so that the mean wage is 3.428 among those
with health insurance. In the population without health insurance we have pSS(w =4 |h =0 )=.231 and
pSS(w =6 |h =0 )=.769. Then the mean wage in this group is 5.538. The diﬀerence in means in this
example is
ESS(w|h =0 ) − ESS(w|h =1 )
=2 .11
> 1=MWP.
Thus this diﬀerence severely overestimates the individual’s marginal valuation of health insurance pro-
vision.
The example serves to illustrate the point that there is little relationship between the cross-sectional
diﬀerences in means and the MWP deﬁned in terms of the utility function. By altering the oﬀer
distribution probabilities (i.e., M), we could get the steady state diﬀerences to equal MWP, or be
less than it, etc. The fundamental indeterminacy we are illustrating is not d u et ot h ef a c tt h a tw e
are not utilizing an equilibrium search framework (in which the oﬀer distribution is endogenous). In
fact, Hwang et al. (1998) develop a parallel argument using the equilibrium search model framework of
Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
The case of household search is a bit more involved, clearly. The main lesson we have learned from
the model analysis presented above is that, even when health insurance coverage at the spouses’ jobs are
perfect substitutes in an instantaneous sense, they are not in a dynamic one. Moreover, we have shown
that the estimation of a dynamic, single-agent model of labor market decisions will lead to inconsistent
estimates of the parameters of that agent’s labor market environment and preferences.
6 Empirical Results
This section presents the estimation results based on the econometric model discussed in the previous
section. Table 2 presents the method of simulated moments estimates for three speciﬁcations of the
model.15 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation treats the spouses as individual agents and hence there is no link
between the labor market decisions of the spouses. The second speciﬁcation accounts for the joint
nature of the employment decision-making process, but does not include any information about the
relationship between the labor market outcomes of the two spouses. In this speciﬁcation we simply
include the same moments that we used in the single-agent speciﬁcations, but allow for interaction
15Table A1 in the appendix presents the results for the moments used in the estimation procedure for each of the three
speciﬁcations. In addition, the table presents the sample value and the weight associated with each moment.
19between the behavior of the two spouses. In the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, we include additional information
that accounts for the relationship between the labor market outcomes of the two spouses. Obviously this
is our preferred speciﬁcation since it not only takes into account the joint nature of the decision-making
process, but explicitly includes information about the joint outcomes of the household members. Hence,
all the results that follow are based on the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, what we are calling the "Joint speciﬁcation
with Cross Moments." There are four key results that deserve further discussion.
First, for both spouses the wage oﬀer distribution of insured jobs stochastically dominates the wage
oﬀer distribution of uninsured jobs. This result points directly to the diﬃculty in trying to uncover
the marginal willingness to pay for health insurance using cross-sectional analysis. This relationship is
consistent across the various speciﬁcations of the model. In addition, the proportion of job oﬀers that
include health insurance coverage is roughly the same for husbands and wives. Again, this result is
consistent across the various speciﬁcations of the model. This result indicates that the large diﬀerences
between health insurance coverage patterns of husbands and wives that we observe in the data cannot
be explained by the proportion of jobs that oﬀer health insurance coverage, but arise due to diﬀerences
in the relative wage distributions of the household members.
A second important result is the rather large diﬀerence in the labor market environments faced by
husbands and wives. The estimates from the single-agent speciﬁcations indicate that while husbands
receive job oﬀers at nearly twice the rate of wives when unemployed, they receive oﬀers at approximately
the same rate when employed. However, once we account for the joint nature of the decision-making
process the job oﬀer rates in unemployment converge while the job oﬀer rates in employment diverge. In
the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, husbands receive job oﬀers when unemployed at only a slightly higher rate than
w i v e s ,b u tt h er a t ea tw h i c ht h e yr e c e i v eo ﬀers in employment is nearly four times higher. This suggests
that the single-agent speciﬁcations are misspeciﬁed since they do not take into account the earnings
process of the other spouse. For example, the high observed unemployment rate of wives translates
i n t oal o wj o bo ﬀer rate in unemployment in the single-agent speciﬁcation. In the joint speciﬁcations,
however, the high rate of unemployment can be largely explained by the wage process of husbands and
hence the estimated job oﬀer rate increases substantially.
The third and perhaps most important result within the context of our desire and ability to estimate
the marginal willingness to pay for health insurance coverage are the estimates for the utility premium
from health insurance coverage, ξ. In the single-agent speciﬁcations, the estimate of ξ for both husbands
and wives is quite low. In the joint speciﬁcation without additional moments, the household value of
health insurance is still seemingly quite low. On the other hand, once we include additional moments
that capture some information about the joint nature of the labor market outcomes the estimate of ξ
increases substantially.
Given the fact that we are allowing for decreasing marginal utility of income, it is diﬃcult to interpret
the parameter, ξ. One way to interpret the eﬀect of ξ is by computing the marginal willingness to pay
when both spouses are unemployed. To begin, in the single-agent speciﬁcations, the marginal willingness
to pay for husbands can be computed as w∗
1(0)−w∗
1(1) = 10.11−9.40 = 0.71.T h i sd i ﬀerential suggests
that husbands are willing to take a 7% pay cut to take a job with health insurance coverage. Similarly,
the marginal willingness to pay for women is given by w∗
2(0) − w∗
2(1) = 6.25 − 5.79 = 0.46. Again, this
diﬀerential suggests that wives are willing to take a 7.4% pay cut to take a job with health insurance
coverage. In the initial joint speciﬁcation, the household is willing to take a 8.5% pay cut for the
husband to take a job with health insurance coverage and a 8.4% pay cut for the wife to take a job
with health insurance coverage. Since other parameter estimates changed between the single-agent
speciﬁcations and the initial joint speciﬁcation it is interesting to note that the marginal willingness
to pay estimates do not change substantially. Finally, in the joint speciﬁcation that includes cross
moments, we can calculate the marginal willingness to pay for health insurance coverage for husbands
20as w∗
1(0) − w∗
1(1) = 5.96 − 3.51 = 2.45. This implies that the household in this employment state
would be willing to have the husband take a 41% pay cut to take a job with health insurance coverage.
Similarly, the marginal willingness to pay for health insurance coverage for wives can be calculated as
w∗
2(0) − w∗
2(1) = 4.88 − 2.67 = 2.21 which implies that the household is willing to have the wife take
a 45% pay cut to take a job with health insurance coverage. Since most of the estimates of the labor
market parameters are similar in the two joint speciﬁcations, it is fairly safe to assume that the large
increase in the estimated value of ξ is driving the dramatic increases in these two marginal willingness
to pay estimates.
To allow a direct comparison to frequently cited statistics, Table 3 contains the predicted values for
the same descriptive statistics presented in Table 1. We ﬁt the cross-sectional moments for husbands
quite well. The predicted unemployment rate, health insurance coverage rate, and the conditional mean
wages are all relatively close to their sample analogs. On the other hand, we do not ﬁt the cross-sectional
moments for wives nearly as well. The most striking diﬀerence is between the predicted unemployment
rate (about 7%) and the sample unemployment rate (about 20%). In addition, in contrast to what
is observed in the data, the estimates suggest that mean wages are higher in uninsured jobs than in
insured jobs for wives.
It is also interesting to note that the model does a reasonably good job of predicting the conditional
unemployment and health insurance coverage rates, but a poor job of predicting the relationship between
conditional mean wages. In particular, as was discussed in the data section above, the unemployment
rate is higher for wives whose husbands have employer-provided health insurance. The model predicts
the same relationship. Similarly, the health insurance coverage rate is higher for wives whose hubands
do not have employer-provided health insurance and the model predicts this relationship as well.
In order to determine how changes in the underlying parameters of the model aﬀect the labor market
outcomes of the spouses and the household as a unit, we carry out a straightforward comparative static
exercise. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4. Each entry in the table measures the
percent change in the outcome given a 10% increase in the parameter of interest while holding the other
parameters ﬁxed at their estimated values. For example, if we increase the husband’s job oﬀer rate in
unemployment, λN
1 , by 10% from 0.279 to 0.307, the unemployment rate of husbands decreases from
1.41% to 1.40% or a 0.71% decline. Similarly, the unemployment rate of wives decreases from 6.67%
to 6.18% for a 7.3% decline. These comparative static results highlight the fact that the labor market
environment of one spouse will not only aﬀect the labor market outcomes of that spouse, but also will
aﬀect the labor market outcomes of the other spouse and the household as a unit.
Since we are particularly interested in how certain parameters aﬀect whether the household is covered
by employer-provided health insurance, we will only discuss how health insurance coverage rates are
aﬀected by changes in the labor market environment. Since the results are qualitatively similar when we
change the labor market environment of the husband or the wife ,we will focus solely on changes to the
husbands labor market environment. First, an 10% increase in the proportion of job oﬀers that provide
health insurance, π, leads to a slightly greater than 10% increase in the cross-sectional proportion of
employed husbands who have employer-provided health insurance and a 7% decline in the proportion
of employed wives who have employer-provided health insurance coverage. On net, this increase leads
to only a 0.5% increase in the proportion of households that are covered by employer-provided health
insurance. One way to think about this result is to think about what happens when all the job oﬀers
received by the husbands provide insurance. In this case, wives will still value employer-provided health
insurance since their husbands may become unemployed at some point in the future. Therefore, there
is still the option value of spousal health insurance but it declines in π.
Second, a 10% increase in the location parameter of the insured wage distribution, µ1,l e a d st oa
30% increase in the coverage rate of employed husbands, a 22% decline in the coverage rate of employed
21wives, and a net increase in the coverage rate of 1.7%. This increase essentially makes insured jobs for
husbands better for two reasons, the health insurance coverage and the higher wages. This shift in the
insured wage distribution facing husbands makes them more likely to wait for an insured job (hence the
small increase in the unemployment rate) and also makes wives’ health insurance coverage relatively
less valuable to the household since husbands are much more likely to be employed at a high paying
insured job. Conversely, a 10% increase in the location parameter of the uninsured wage distribution,
µ0, drops the coverage rate of employed husbands by more than 62%, increases the coverage rate of
employed wives by 44%, and leads an almost 3% decline in the coverage rate of the household.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the discussion that follows, a 10% increase in the value
of health insurance, ξ, leads to relatively small increases in the coverage rates of both spouses and for
the household as a unit. By increasing the value of health insurance, the household is more willing
to trade income for health insurance and therefore the coverage rates will increase. It is interesting to
note that while the percent of employed husbands with coverage increases by 0.33% and the percent
of employed wives with coverage increases by 0.53%, the household coverage rate only increases by
0.28%. This results suggests that proportion of households with two health insurance policies increases
substantially.
We conclude this section by returning to the discussion of the ability to estimate the households’
marginal willingness to pay for health insurance within the context of our behavioral model. We present
two sets of estimates in Figure 2a and Figure 2b. The ﬁrst set of estimates considers the situation in
which the husband is currently employed and the wife is unemployed and searching for employment.
While it is certainly the case that there exists a continuum of marginal willingness to pay estimates
within the current employment state faced by the household, we consider only one particular set of
estimates. Namely, assume that the wife has a wage oﬀer without health insurance coverage that
makes her indiﬀerent between remaining unemployed and accepting the job. We denote this reservation
wage as ˆ w2(0;w1,h 1,0,0) where (w1,h 1) indicates the characteristics of the husband’s current job. We
then estimate the MWP for health insurance for wives as the diﬀerence between this wage and the
minimally acceptable wage in a job that provides health insurance. This reservation wage is denoted as
ˆ w2(1;w1,h 1,0,0) and the marginal willingness to pay for health insurance for wives is given by
MWP2(w1,h 1)=ˆ w2(0;w1,h 1,0,0) − ˆ w2(1;w1,h 1,0,0).
Figure 2a plots these estimates when h1 =1(Insured Husband) and h1 =0(Uninsured Husband) and
considers all acceptable wages such that w1 ≥ w∗
1(h1). Similarly, in Figure 2b we plot the marginal
willingness to pay for health insurance for husbands which is estimated by
MWP1(w2,h 2)=ˆ w1(0;0,0,w 2,h 2) − ˆ w1(1;0,0,w 2,h 2).
Again, we consider the cases when h2 =1(Insured Wife) and h2 =0(Uninsured Wife) and consider all
acceptable wages for the wife such that w2 ≥ w∗
2(h2).
The estimates presented in the ﬁgures highlight two particularly interesting and important results.
First, when the husband does not have health insurance coverage at his current job, the marginal
willingness to pay for health insurance for his wife increases (although not everywhere) in the husband’s
wage. This result comes directly from the nonlinearity in the utility function (recall that ˆ δ =0 .53)
and the implication that the marginal utility of income is decreasing. Therefore as the husband’s wage
increases the household is more willing to trade additional wages for health insurance coverage. A
similar result is true for the marginal willingness to pay for health insurance coverage for husbands
when the wife is currently employed at an uninsured job.
Second, when the husband’s current job provides health insurance coverage, the marginal willingness
to pay for coverage for the wife is (for the most part) decreasing in the husband’s current wage. In
22spite of this fact, the marginal willingness to pay always remains positive. This fact clearly depicts the
option value of a second health insurance coverage for the household when employer-provided health
insurance is a household public good.
7 Policy Implications of the Analysis
Many developed countries make the provision of health care services a governmental responsibility. In
the U.S., the costs and beneﬁts of a government-provided national health care system have been hotly
debated for decades. Although health care costs consume about one-seventh of the Gross Domestic
Product of the U.S. even as health indicators of the U.S. population signiﬁcantly trail those of other
developed countries, the U.S. has not moved to implement any sweeping changes in health care policy.
In part this is attributable to the sheer magnitude of the task of forecasting the eﬀects of changing an
institution that has such a direct impact on the lives of every population member.
One problem with performing a cost-beneﬁt analysis for any type of major change in health care
institutions is determining the beneﬁts. Social science research has not been terribly helpful in pinning
down exactly what are the beneﬁts from health insurance coverage. For example, to this day it has
not deﬁnitely established that health insurance coverage, per se, leads to better health outcomes.16 Of
course, even if health care insurance provision and health outcomes are unrelated, on average, doesn’t
imply that individuals do not value having health insurance. Health insurance may be particularly
valued in the case of catastrophic illnesses, for example, especially when individuals exhibit high degrees
of risk aversion.
To assess the valuation of health insurance, economists have attempted to compute the willingness
to pay for given levels of health insurance coverage, most often utilizing wage information. Since
over 90 percent of individuals covered by health insurance plans receive their insurance through their
own or a family member’s employer, a natural way to proceed is to attempt to infer the valuation of
health insurance by the diﬀerence in wages paid to similarly-skilled workers by employers providing
health insurance coverage and by those who do not. This has lead to a large empirical literature
in which a function of an employee’s wage appears as a dependent variable and regressors include the
individual’s “productivity” characteristics (e.g., schooling, age, tenure at the ﬁrm) as well as whether he
or she receives employer-provided health insurance. In the simplest possible speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient
associated with the health insurance provision indicator variable (which should be negative under the
theory of compensating diﬀerentials) indicates the wage penalty the individual is willing to accept to
be covered by health insurance. The higher is this coeﬃcient, in absolute value, the greater the beneﬁt
of providing health insurance coverage universally, for example.
Consider the following example. Let x1(h1,h 2) denote the mean wage paid to husbands when the
health insurance status of their jobs is h1 and their wives’ jobs is h2. Assuming that health insurance
coverage for one spouse extends to entire household and thinking about the trade-oﬀ between wages and
health insurance coverage in a static way means there is no value to “double” coverage. Then, consider
the diﬀerence
x1(0,1) − x1(1,1).
Since the household is covered by health insurance in this case (i.e., the wives have coverage), there is
no value of health insurance to the husband and, other things equal, there should be no wage penalty.
16The only large scale experimental study capable of yielding relatively unambiguous causal inferences was the Rand
Health Insurance Experiment, which was conducted in the 1970s, and which found limited eﬀects of free health insurance
on health outcomes. The researcher’s interpretation was that health care utilization is high even when unsubsidized, so
that price reductions, even to zero, have small eﬀects on health outcomes (Keeler (1992)).
23This is the control group. Next, consider the diﬀerence
x1(0,0) − x1(1,0).
This diﬀerence measures the wage premium that a husband pays for health insurance coverage. Then,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the wage penalty for husband’s health insurance coverage is given
by
[x1(0,0) − x1(1,0)] − [x1(0,1) − x1(1,1)].
Since the ﬁrst term in brackets reﬂects the wage premium that husbands pay for health insurance and
whatever diﬀerences there are in the wage oﬀer distributions and the second term only contains the
“selection” factor, the diﬀerence is the wage penalty for health insurance coverage. This could also be
applied to wives, of course.
Using the data in our cross-section, we estimate that the wage penalty for husbands is
[x1(0,0) − x1(1,0)] − [x1(0,1) − x1(1,1)] = [12.48 − 18.49] − [14.92 − 16.09]
= −6.01 − (−1.17)
= −4.84
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the wage penalty for wives is given by
[x2(0,0) − x2(0,1)] − [x2(1,0) − x2(1,1)] = [9.09 − 15.32] − [11.88 − 14.17]
= −6.23 − (−2.29)
= −3.94
In both cases we ﬁnd no evidence of a wage penalty in the data.
While relatively sophisticated econometric methods have been used in an attempt to mitigate such
likely problems as the correlation between the disturbance term in the regression and health insurance
coverage, less attention has been given to the interpretation of the willingness to pay estimates obtained
from these linear regression estimators. Moreover, although some research has explicitly considered the
existence of population heterogeneity in the marginal willingness to pay, the source of this heterogeneity
is not investigated. Though it could be due to heterogeneous attitudes towards risk, we argue in
this paper that cross-sectional regression speciﬁcations from which these estimates are obtained are
fundamentally misspeciﬁed. In our highly stylized model of the demand for health insurance, we posit
that the (cardinal) utility gain from having health insurance is homogeneous in the population. Even
under this highly restrictive assumption, our model generates heterogeneity in the marginal willingness
to pay for health insurance in the cross-section when we do not properly account for variation in the
state variables characterizing the household’s current environment.
We now turn to an illustration of this point using our model estimates. The time-varying state
variables of which we are speaking are the vector (w1,h 1,w 2,h 2).17 As was discussed above, in the
case of a single-individual model, it is reasonable to deﬁn et h eM W Pa st h ed i ﬀerence in reservation
wages for an individual who is currently unemployed. In this case, the MWP is a scalar. In the case
of two spouses, the MWP for one spouse is a function of the job employment status of the their mate.
In the case of the husband, his marginal willingness to pay for health insurance is a function of the
wife’s characteristics, (w2,h 2). Let his MWP function be given by MWP1(w2,h 2). The function itself is
determined by all of the parameters that characterize the market and household environment, including
17The nonlabor income of the household is treated as a time-invariant characteristic of the household in our modeling
framework, and we do not emphasize its contribution to heterogeneity in the MWP in this discussion.
24preference parameters, wage and health insurance oﬀer distributions for both spouses, rates of arrival
of oﬀers, etc. By the same token, the distribution of the (w2,h 2), in the long run, is determined by
these same primitive parameters. If we deﬁne the steady state distribution of all four state variables by
FSS(w1,h 1,h 2,d 2), then the marginal bivariate distribution of the wife’s labor market characteristics
are given by FSS
2 (w2,h 2)=FSS
2C (w2|h2)pSS









This is clearly an average measure of the willingness to pay over the various employment states the
wife can occupy. This long run expected value is an adequate representation of preferences regarding
health insurance in the population only when the distribution of FSS
2 is degenerate and/or MWP1 is
(approximately) across states. If we are willing to assume that the function MWP1 is diﬀerentiable in
its ﬁrst argument (the wage of the wife), then using a ﬁrst order Taylor series expansion we have
VA R (MWP1) $
∂MWP1(E(w2|h2 =0 ) ,0)
∂w2
VA R (w2|h =0 ) pSS
2 (h =0 )
+
∂MWP1(E(w2|h2 =1 ) ,1)
∂w2
VA R (w2|h =1 ) pSS
2 (h =1 ) .
Given the substantial variability we observe in health insurance and wage outcomes given the model
estimates, and the substantial variability in the MWP function with respect to wages, we are able to
generate signiﬁcant variation in MWP1 simply through labor market dynamics. This variability does not
come from any inherent diﬀerences in preferences regarding health insurance, it must be remembered.
Adding this feature to the model would be likely to increase the variation in MWP1 from the model.18
We have considered the MWP in the case where the husband was the unemployed searcher. We
can repeat the analysis of the MWP after reversing the role of the husband and wife. The results will
diﬀer whenever the labor market environments of wives and husbands diﬀer, which is clearly the case
here given our model estimates.
Using our model estimates, we ﬁnd that the steady-state marginal willingness to pay for husband’s
health insurance coverage is 1.73 while it is 1.29 for wives. This diﬀerence suggests that even though
health insurance is a public good within the household and there is a common valuation of coverage
within the household ξ, the average amount that the household is willing to pay for the husband’s
coverage is higher than the average amount the household is willing to pay for the wife’s coverage.
This diﬀerence is driven by diﬀerences in underlying labor market environments facing the two spouese.
M o r e o v e r ,w ee s t i m a t et h a tt h ev a r i a n c ei nt h em a r ginal willingness to pay is 5.14 for husbands and
1.90 for wives. In both cases, there is a substantial amount of variability in the marginal willingness to
pay that does not arise from any inherent heterogeneity in preferences for health insurance coverage,
but due to the dynamic decision-making process of the household.
From the policy perspective, probably the most important point that can be taken from our analysis
is that in a tightly speciﬁed, dynamic labor market model that incorporates household behavior and
demand for employer-provided health insurance coverage, there exists substantial variability in the will-
ingness to pay for health insurance across labor market states. Attempts to estimate an individual’s or
household’s valuation of health insurance that abstract from labor market dynamics or the “publicness”
18Adding heterogeneity in preferences, say the parameter ξ, would not necessarily lead to increased cross-sectional
variability in MWP1. To determine whether this is the case requires solving for the reservation wage of each type of agent
and then aggregating outcomes. Allowing variance in a parameter that is currently constrained to be constant does not
necessarily lead to increased cross-sectional variation in such a case.
25of most employer-provided health insurance coverage are likely to lead to incorrect inferences. Our
analysis is a ﬁrst step in looking at the determinants of the willingness to pay, where variability in this
measures stems from the distribution of labor market outcomes in the population.
To be truly useful as an input into policy decisions, the framework of our analysis would have to
be expanded considerably. The most fundamental question we have failed to address, as have the vast
majority of researchers before us, is what drives the demand for health insurance? For example, does
it primarily stem from the fear that a catastrophic illness will lead to ﬁnancial ruin? If so, do these
concerns have a basis in fact? Given the lack of hard evidence regarding the eﬀect of health insurance
coverage on health outcomes, it is a challenging and important task to understand the positive valuation
of health insurance coverage. Only after we have some idea regarding these motivations can we begin
to perform modeling and estimation exercises that will yield results directly usable by policy makers.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have taken a ﬁrst step in rectifying the neglect of spousal search in a dynamic model
of household behavior. The framework within which we have worked is highly stylized, and most
importantly omits strategic interactions between spouses as well as the presence of capital markets. It
shares the problem of most theoretical and empirical studies of health insurance by not specifying the
underlying behavioral and technological motives for its demand by the household.
In terms of other theoretical contributions, we consider the case of multiattribute oﬀers. While there
are a number of other job characteristics besides health insurance provision that could be included in
this model, health insurance is a particularly important characteristic in the household search frame-
work given its quasi-publicness. We illustrate the manner in which the publicness of health insurance
coverage and a nonconstant marginal utility of household consumption combine to link the labor market
decisions of the spouses. This interdependence in decision-making and payoﬀs in a dynamic context
makes attempts to compute the willingness to pay for health insurance from cross-sectional wage-health
insurance relationships misguided. Given the model structure, we can compute willingness to pay func-
tions given the state variables deﬁning the household at a given moment in time. Needless to say, there
is in general no single constant MWP parameter that arises.
We estimate a valuation of health insurance by the household that seems somewhat reasonable. This
gives us some hope that this type of analysis, conducted in a more ambitious equilibrium framework, may
eventually prove useful in stimulating and guiding the policy debate on the health insurance coverage
question.
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Unemployment Rate 1.82 2.69 0.99 1.61
Health Insurance Coverage 
Rate (when Employed) 79.82 60.79 93.30 91.91
Mean Wage in Insured Jobs 18.03 16.09 18.49 19.74
(7.80) (6.76) (7.90) (8.39)
Mean Wage in Uninsured 
Jobs 14.57 14.92 12.48 14.58
(6.66) (6.89) (5.10) (6.22)
Unemployment Rate 19.81 22.86 7.98 17.68
Health Insurance Coverage 
Rate (when Employed) 51.08 40.08 85.74 73.83
Mean Wage in Insured Jobs 14.58 14.17 15.32 13.28
(7.20) (7.20) (7.31) (4.85)
Mean Wage in Uninsured 
Jobs 11.63 11.88 9.09 5.99










0.236 (0.005) 0.091 (0.004) 0.277 (0.003) 0.223 (0.004) 0.279 (0.010) 0.243 (0.005)
λ
E
0.027 (0.002) 0.027 (0.003) 0.065 (0.002) 0.027 (0.003) 0.070 (0.004) 0.017 (0.001)
η
1
0.018 (0.001) 0.041 (0.006) 0.022 (0.001) 0.015 (0.001) 0.027 (0.002) 0.013 (0.001)
η
0
0.033 (0.002) 0.023 (0.003) 0.031 (0.001) 0.047 (0.002) 0.032 (0.003) 0.050 (0.004)
π 0.699 (0.003) 0.739 (0.011) 0.703 (0.001) 0.715 (0.002) 0.733 (0.004) 0.791 (0.004)
µ
1
2.331 (0.009) 1.831 (0.024) 2.307 (0.007) 1.821 (0.008) 2.282 (0.006) 1.756 (0.019)
σ
1
0.441 (0.005) 0.493 (0.010) 0.415 (0.004) 0.390 (0.006) 0.415 (0.012) 0.346 (0.007)
µ
0
2.498 (0.008) 2.310 (0.017) 2.445 (0.005) 2.393 (0.011) 2.514 (0.005) 2.403 (0.11)
σ
0
0.182 (0.006) 0.162 (0.007) 0.173 (0.002) 0.141 (0.003) 0.139 (0.005) 0.135 (0.004)
ξ 0.192 (0.004) 0.263 (0.008) 0.199 (0.002) 1.210 (0.003)




















Unemployment Rate 1.41 1.68 1.12 0.90
Health Insurance Coverage 
Rate (when Employed) 73.13 55.37 96.16 85.93
Mean Wage in Insured Jobs 17.99 18.52 17.56 17.91
(5.65) (5.79) (5.50) (5.64)
Mean Wage in Uninsured 
Jobs 14.87 14.86 14.90 15.12
(1.78) (1.77) (1.88) (1.69)
Unemployment Rate 6.67 7.88 3.51 4.26
Health Insurance Coverage 
Rate (when Employed) 58.85 45.02 94.29 98.58
Mean Wage in Insured Jobs 11.49 11.82 11.09 11.17
(1.99) (1.86) (2.08) (2.29)
Mean Wage in Uninsured 
Jobs 12.29 12.26 13.10 12.33






Spouseʹs Employment StatusHusbands Wives Husbands Wives Household Husbands Wives Household
λ
N
‐0.709 ‐7.346 ‐0.967 0.764 ‐0.082 ‐0.164 ‐0.041 0.098
λ
E
1.418 ‐3.148 ‐0.216 0.702 0.154 0.681 0.019 0.496
η
1
2.837 ‐5.397 ‐2.804 1.847 0.000 ‐1.038 ‐0.243 ‐0.597
η
0
4.255 ‐3.448 2.420 ‐1.626 0.124 ‐0.114 0.252 0.091
π 7.092 ‐0.600 10.098 ‐6.795 0.525 0.551 0.841 0.621
µ
1
1.418 7.946 30.179 ‐22.392 1.709 24.120 2.641 15.394
σ
1
1.418 0.150 1.380 ‐0.190 0.196 3.791 ‐0.002 2.276
µ
0
109.220 ‐23.388 ‐62.761 44.991 ‐2.749 11.557 ‐6.504 3.988
σ
0
4.965 ‐4.948 ‐0.651 1.607 ‐0.237 1.677 ‐0.105 1.069
λ
N
‐8.511 ‐1.199 ‐0.482 ‐2.069 ‐0.134 ‐0.396 0.906 0.226
λ
E
2.128 ‐3.898 ‐0.968 1.411 ‐0.021 ‐0.217 0.064 ‐0.014
η
1
4.255 ‐0.150 0.894 ‐2.432 ‐0.072 ‐0.006 ‐0.176 ‐0.106
η
0
‐12.766 ‐5.097 ‐1.816 4.753 0.288 ‐0.144 ‐0.621 ‐0.079
π 3.546 ‐10.645 ‐9.455 24.147 0.360 ‐0.444 ‐1.887 ‐0.749
µ
1
8.511 ‐15.982 ‐15.209 39.818 0.855 ‐0.320 10.362 4.319
σ
1
8.511 0.150 ‐3.489 10.919 0.010 ‐0.463 4.302 1.341
µ
0
‐4.965 26.537 21.439 ‐60.559 ‐1.133 ‐0.417 24.013 8.343
σ
0
1.418 1.199 0.367 ‐1.208 ‐0.124 ‐0.116 0.997 0.277
ξ ‐2.837 1.049 0.334 0.531 0.278 ‐0.204 ‐0.108 ‐0.172





































































































































































































m(I(s0 = 1)) 0.784 87.225 0.762 0.730 0.721
m(I(s0 = 0)) 0.198 89.337 0.226 0.255 0.265
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1)) 14.134 3.545 14.261 14.179 12.968
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1)) 10.143 5.000 9.514 9.893 9.386
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0)) 2.887 5.452 3.399 3.830 3.940
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0)) 6.520 3.959 6.384 6.619 6.627
m(I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 1)) 0.002 741.097 0.009 0.010 0.009
m(I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 0)) 0.007 422.417 0.003 0.005 0.005
m(I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.058 151.783 0.069 0.071 0.098
m(I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.053 157.841 0.036 0.046 0.046
m(I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.011 335.924 0.007 0.011 0.009
m(I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.026 222.210 0.023 0.033 0.043
m(I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.040 179.791 0.040 0.043 0.040
m(I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.002 720.440 0.003 0.007 0.004
m(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 1)) 0.030 57.171 0.136 0.149 0.129
sd(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 1)) 0.629 4.578 1.494 1.570 1.426
m(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 0)) 0.099 28.612 0.038 0.073 0.067
sd(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 0)) 1.248 3.816 0.705 0.999 0.950
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 1.071 7.523 1.089 1.193 1.504
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 4.738 2.862 4.280 4.560 4.903
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.139 16.758 0.068 0.044 ‐0.028
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 2.131 3.580 2.455 2.444 2.661
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.821 9.405 0.566 0.772 0.701
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 3.784 3.500 3.093 3.702 3.405
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.097 24.018 ‐0.056 ‐0.137 ‐0.061
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 1.476 4.402 1.217 1.451 1.277
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.206 16.231 0.132 0.212 0.154
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 2.185 2.288 1.585 2.102 1.717
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.316 17.061 0.320 0.456 0.596
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 2.096 4.453 2.118 2.509 2.845
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.040 29.874 0.008 0.002 0.011
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 1.192 3.959 0.461 0.479 0.477
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.642 10.323 0.562 0.592 0.561
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 3.420 3.182 2.798 2.842 2.762
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.085 38.466 0.129 0.198 0.090




Momentm(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.035 41.707 0.050 0.099 0.066
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.832 2.563 0.878 1.229 0.997
m(I(s0 = 1)) 0.410 72.518 0.489 0.491 0.549
m(I(s0 = 0)) 0.392 73.885 0.458 0.454 0.384
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1)) 5.974 4.221 6.657 6.700 6.309
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1)) 8.526 4.170 7.565 7.062 5.905
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0)) 4.564 5.314 5.335 5.695 4.721
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0)) 6.695 5.527 5.921 6.309 6.034
m(I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 1)) 0.006 460.691 0.027 0.015 0.022
m(I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 0)) 0.030 209.618 0.021 0.034 0.036
m(I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.028 222.174 0.074 0.027 0.027
m(I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.047 164.422 0.055 0.032 0.026
m(I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.006 456.353 0.029 0.014 0.019
m(I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.046 170.338 0.048 0.076 0.054
m(I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.043 178.650 0.060 0.041 0.030
m(I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.025 226.110 0.016 0.033 0.035
m(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 1)) 0.085 32.485 0.288 0.192 0.234
sd(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 1)) 1.142 4.018 1.846 1.564 1.583
m(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 0)) 0.279 20.801 0.230 0.405 0.421
sd(w1 x I(s0 = ‐1) x I(s1 = 0)) 1.747 4.941 1.581 2.176 2.207
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.425 12.467 0.860 0.349 0.288
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 2.876 2.584 3.247 2.146 1.757
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.097 24.802 0.042 0.021 0.008
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 1.470 3.293 1.672 0.607 0.485
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.604 11.461 0.607 0.401 0.279
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 3.068 3.380 2.707 2.245 1.726
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.025 35.903 ‐0.007 0.003 0.044
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 1.005 6.420 1.094 0.517 0.454
m(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.074 37.384 0.391 0.194 0.213
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 1) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.976 4.913 2.410 1.652 1.555
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.471 14.079 0.514 0.923 0.655
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 2.494 3.657 2.308 3.233 2.751
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) ‐0.008 44.999 0.042 0.018 0.000
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 0) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.784 8.453 0.518 0.501 0.424
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.541 12.897 0.664 0.502 0.370
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 2.779 4.138 2.664 2.451 2.108
m((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 0.046 25.911 0.101 0.028 ‐0.033
sd((w1 ‐ w0) x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = 1) x I(e0  ≠ e1)) 1.389 3.523 1.206 0.554 0.438
m(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 0.241 21.685 0.180 0.415 0.423
sd(w0 x I(s0 = 0) x I(s1 = ‐1)) 1.650 4.566 1.438 2.259 2.250
Wifeʹs Labor Market Outcomesm(I(s0
(1)  = 1) x I(s0
(2)  = ‐1)) 0.179 92.975 0.057
m(I(s0
(1)  = 0) x I(s0
(2)  = ‐1)) 0.016 281.070 0.009
m(I(s0
(1)  = 1) x I(s0
(2)  = 1)) 0.242 82.375 0.299
m(I(s0
(1)  = 0) x I(s0




















(2)  = 0)) 3.105 1.462 2.857
Joint Labor Market Outcomes
Note: The function m  represents the mean, the function sd  represents the standard deviation, and the function I is the 
indicator function that equals 1 if the argument is true. The variable definitions are as follows: {s0, w0, e0}  are the labor 
market state (equal to 1 if at an insured job, 0 if at an uninsured job, and ‐1 if unemployed), hourly wage rate, and 
employer number at the initial observation, {s1, w1, e1 }  are the labor market state, hourly wage rate, and employer 
number at the subsequent observation. In the bottom panel the superscipt (1)  refers to husbands and the superscript 
(2)  refers to wives.